NATO’s decision to move toward a 5% defense spending target by 2035 marks one of the biggest shifts in the alliance’s modern history. But it also raises a long-running question: why did the United States carry such a large share of NATO’s military burden for decades?
The answer begins with the end of the Cold War.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, many European governments believed the most dangerous era of continental military confrontation had ended. Instead of maintaining Cold War-level defense budgets, they redirected money toward domestic priorities such as healthcare, pensions, education, infrastructure, and social welfare programs.
That shift became known as the “peace dividend.” For many European voters, it made sense. The Soviet threat had disappeared, Europe was integrating economically, and the United States continued to keep troops, bases, intelligence networks, logistics systems, and nuclear deterrence in place across the continent.
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Over time, that created a major imbalance. Washington remained NATO’s central military power, while many European allies allowed their armed forces to shrink, age, or become dependent on American capabilities.
The issue was not new. U.S. presidents from both parties repeatedly pushed European allies to spend more on their own defense. American officials argued that U.S. taxpayers were paying too much for Europe’s security while wealthy European countries spent more heavily on domestic programs.
But the pressure rarely changed the basic structure of the alliance. The United States continued to guarantee European security, and Europe had little immediate incentive to rebuild its militaries quickly.
That dynamic created what defense analysts often describe as a dependency problem. If allies believe the United States will always provide the ultimate security guarantee, they can delay difficult spending decisions at home. Cutting defense is often easier politically than cutting popular social programs.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 began to change the conversation. NATO members agreed to move toward spending at least 2% of GDP on defense, but progress was slow and uneven. Some allies met the target quickly, especially countries closer to Russia. Others lagged behind.
The real turning point came after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The war showed that large-scale conflict in Europe was no longer theoretical. It also exposed shortages in ammunition, air defense, production capacity, and military readiness across the continent.
Trump’s pressure added another shock. Unlike previous U.S. presidents, he openly questioned whether American protection should be automatic for allies that failed to meet defense spending commitments. European leaders may not have liked the message, but it forced a debate they could no longer avoid.
The result is NATO’s new spending goal. Under the plan agreed at The Hague, allies are expected to allocate 5% of GDP by 2035, including 3.5% for core defense requirements and 1.5% for broader defense-related investments such as infrastructure, cybersecurity, and resilience.
That target is far higher than NATO’s previous 2% benchmark and reflects a new security reality. Europe is facing a more aggressive Russia, a long war in Ukraine, pressure on defense industries, and uncertainty about how much the United States will continue to carry.
Still, spending more money will not instantly solve NATO’s problems. Many European militaries need more soldiers, ammunition, air defense systems, logistics capacity, command experience, and industrial production. Those cannot be rebuilt overnight.
The alliance’s challenge now is turning new money into real military power. Budgets matter, but readiness, production, leadership, and coordination matter just as much.
For decades, NATO’s imbalance survived because the United States was willing to act as Europe’s security backstop. The new spending target shows that era is changing — but it will take years before Europe can fully close the gap.
Why It Matters
NATO’s spending imbalance matters because the alliance depends on credible deterrence. If European members lack the equipment, troops, and industrial capacity to defend themselves, NATO remains heavily dependent on the United States.
That dependency creates political tension in Washington and strategic risk in Europe. If Americans believe allies are not paying their fair share, support for NATO can weaken. If Russia believes Europe is militarily unprepared, deterrence becomes less effective.
The 5% target is meant to address both problems: reassure the United States that allies are contributing more, and show Russia that NATO is serious about rebuilding its military strength.
What Comes Next
The next test is implementation. NATO members must now turn promises into budgets, contracts, factories, soldiers, and deployable forces.
Some countries will move faster than others. Eastern European allies near Russia are likely to keep pushing hard, while larger Western European economies may face domestic resistance over the cost.
The key question is whether the 5% pledge becomes a real military transformation or another political target that governments struggle to meet.
APT News shared remarks from U.S. War Secretary Pete Hegseth calling for NATO and European allies to take on more defense responsibility and reduce dependence on Washington.
“Less Shangri-La, more ships and subs”. US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth delivered a stark message to NATO and European allies: the era of US defence “subsidies” is over. Calling for more burden-sharing, Hegseth said alliances need “skin in the game,” not dependence on… pic.twitter.com/7JTOiD3kNd
— APT News (@APT__News) May 30, 2026
